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The Conunission of the European Conununities forwarded to the European 
Parliament the Fifth Report on Competition Policy (annexed to the 'Ninth 
General Report on the activities of the Communities'). 
The European Parliament referred this report to the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, 
On 30 April 1976 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs appointed 
Mr T. Normanton rapporteur. It considered the report at its meetings of 
21 May, 25 June and 13 July 1976. At its meeting of 13 July 1976 the 
committee adopted the motion for a resolution by 9 votes in favour, 1 
against, and 3 abstentions. 
Present: Mr Burgbacher, acting-chairman; Mr Normanton, rapporteur; 
Mr Albertsen, Mr Artzinger, Lord Bessborough (deputizing for Mr Dykes), 
Mr Clerf~yt, Mr Delmotte, Mr Deschamps, Mr Hansen (deputizing for 
Mr Carpentier), Mr Martens (deputizing for Mr Vcln der Mei), Mr Nyborg, 
Mr Prescott, Mr Starke and Mr Suck. 
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The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to 
the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution: 
MO'I'ION FOR l\ RESOLUTION 
on the Fifth Report of the Commission of the European Communities on 
Competition Policy 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard_ to the Fifth Report of the Commission of the European 
Communities on Competition Policy, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs (Doc. 243/76), 
1. Welcomes the Commission's achievement in maintaining progress in the 
field of compclilion policy, which has helped to strengthen the common 
market despite the current severe international economic problems; 
2. Stresses, however, the need for the Commission to extend the scope 
and application of its competition policy to ensure that the whole 
range of Community activity is covered; 
3. Urges the Commission, therefore, to consider how competition policy 
might fruitfully be applied to such diverse areas as social policy, 
the approximation of laws, the relations between the EEC and state-
trading countries, the accession of new Member States, the Common 
Agricultural Policy, fishing policy, and the law of the sea; 
4. Regrets the absence from the Fifth Report of any mention of the com-
petition aspects of energy policy, of consumer protection, of credit 
institutions, of the relationship between Community and national law, 
or of industrial policy, fields in which competition policy clearly 
has a role to play and to which the European Parliament has referred 
in previous resolutions; 
5. Regrets also that insufficient progress has been made in removing 
obstacles to competition in the granting of public contracts; 
6. Notes that there has also been insufficient progress in harmonizing 
export credits; 
7. Stresses the importance for the Commission to monitor developments in 
Member States' national competition policies, with a view to determining 
whether or not they are in tune with the aims of a Community competition 
policy, and calls on the Commission to include an analysis of such 
developments in its future reports; 
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8. Urges the Commission to adopt an unambiguous policy on patent 
licensing, without which it is difficult for undertakings to align 
their activities with the requirements of the Community, and reiterates, 
therefore, its request to the Commission to work out precise guidelines 
for the content of patent agreements which could both ensure the essen-
tial protection for the granter and avoid restraints on marketing 
contrary to the concept of a single market: 
9. Wonders why the Commission has not included in its Fifth Report evidence 
of its continuing investigations into price discrepancies which might indicate 
distortions of competition, on which it reported in its Fourth Report, 
especially in view of the desirability of competition policy playing a 
role in combating inflation: 
10. Supports the Commission's efforts to prevent unfair practices such as 
price-fixing, as exemplified by its action against United Brands: 
11. Welcomes the new principles for coordinating regional aid throughout 
the Community which the Commission has worked out, and places the 
greatest possible importance on the implementation of these principles: 
12. Calls on the Commission to continue its efforts to ensure that any aids 
granted by Memler States do contribute to the necessary restructuring of 
the economy, and do not simply preserve obsolete industrial structures 
or transfer difficulties from one Member State to another: 
13. Welcomes the Commission's adoption of guidelines for judging selective 
distribution agreements, but hopes for continued development in this 
field, with a view to amplifying these basic principles: 
14. Urges the Commission to investigate and develop the role which com-
petition policy could play in helping small and medium sized firms: 
15. Awaits with interest the results of the Commission's examination of the 
business conduct of public undertakings, and the directive which it is 
preparing in this field: 
16. Expresses once again its regret that the Council has still not adopted 
the regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
and urges the Council to adopt this proposal, in the form approved by 
Parliament, without delay: expects the Commission to continue its 
investigations into industrial concentration within the Community and to 
undertake a specific commitment for future action on the proposed merger 
control regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
One of the major objectives underlying the establishment of the 
European Economic Community was, and still is, the creation of a single 
I 
market in which goods and services shall be ·.freely available, at prices 
which arc competitive, qualities which are acceptable, ·and offer the con-
sumor freedom of choice. 
It follows, thcroforo, logically that anything which aims at or leads 
to the artificial division of the community into separate markets, or which 
fixes or maintains prices as between one supplier and another, or which 
establishes policies to restrict supply or refusals to buy (other than on 
normal generally accepted commercial criteria), or which denies freedom of 
choice, must prima facie be in conflict with the Treaty of Rome, the principal 
legal basis on which the EEC was founded. It is by means of its competition 
policy that the Community aims to achieve this major objective and by the 
progress made that the Commission must be judged. 
Having re-confirmed this, however, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that economic and social developments since the signing of the Treaty, both 
within the territories of the Community and in the world in general, are 
giving rise to a need to adopt a degree of flexibility of interpretation 
which could not have been foreseen or provided for in the original Treaty. 
This raises, therefore, the extremely important question of principle, when 
considering the Commission's Fifth Report on Competition Policy, as to 
whether the nature and extent of change has been recognised by the Commission 
and reflected in its actions. 
Regardless of the policies or action programmes of the Commission, the 
difficulties of achieving positive progress cannot be ignored, as the forces 
of resistance to change from nine separate markets to the creation of one 
single Community market are deeply entrenched. The commission appears to 
be making progress as far as the removal of legislative barriers are con-
cerned, though these are increasingly being circumvented by what might be 
described as "administrative" arrangements. The Commission should be much 
more ruthless in this area and be prepared to expose these practices by 
bringing cases to the European Court of Justice, even though it may prove 
difficult to win all of them. Disclosure, or the threat of exposure, can be 
a powerful weapon in the political armoury of the Commission. 
The pace of change, especially in the industrial field, is far from 
satisfactory and though industrial policy is outside the responsibility of 
the Directorate for Competition Policy, the interdependence of these two 
policy sectors appears to be ignored. However, comments in this report by 
the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
are required to concentrate on competition policy in general, and the Fifth 
Report in particular. 
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FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 
I THE SCOPE OF COMPETITION POLICY 
1. The Committeeare even more convinced this year of the need to examine 
competition policy in the context of its overall effect. They therefore 
consider it essential to preface their comments on the Commission's Fifth 
Report itself with a more general summary as it is important that the report 
on competition policy should not "develop into a report for the Directorate-
General for Competition". 1 
The first part of the report will deal with the legal basis of competition 
policy, the development of the problems of competition, the way in which they are 
treated in the Fifth Report of the Commission and finally the general position, 
past and present, of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on this 
subject. 
1. The legal basis of competition policy 
2. The question of competition is dealt with in Articles 85-94 of the 
Treaty of Rome, which aim at achieving effective competition for both 
private and public industry. This area is one where the Commission has full 
responsibility for the formation and application of policy. This is done by 
means of "notifications", enquiries and decisions which it gives or undertakes 
and which may be backed up ultimately by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. The Commission works out proposals for directives or regulations 
which it feels are necessary to make the Treaty rules effective and it submits 
these to the Council of Ministers for examination and approval. 
It is useful to recall these Treaty articles and instruments of the 
Commission's competition policy in that the underlying philosophy of com-
petition policy established in the Treaty is now more and more often being 
called into question. A close examination of these rules shows that the 
Treaty is basically neutral on the question of free market economy or State 
intervention. Contrary to what is still thought by some, the Treaty does 
not embody a purelyliberal or laissez-faire philosophy: in fact Articles 
2 85 and 86 impose rules of competition on both private and public industry. 
1 The report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs on the Fourth Report of the Commission of the European Communities on 
competition Policy by Mr Normanton (Doc.164/75): this report was not adopted 
by the European Parliament. 
2 See J. Vandamme and M. Guerrin "La Reglementation de la Concurrence dans 
la CEE" by Presses Universitaires de France, 1974, pp.104 and 196. 
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The Treaty is basically concerned with the adverse consequences for the 
free circulation of goods and for economic integration which may result from 
restrictive agreements, dominant market positions, sales monopolies or State 
aids. 
Consequently, there is no need to call into question the philosophy of 
competition policy as such but rather to re-examine it in the light of recent 
developments and changes in the economic system. 
2. The development of competition problems 
a) The development of competition policy 
3. Although the original purpose of competition policy was to ensure the 
proper functioning of a market economy, there have been marked economic 
changes since then that have affected the role of competition policy itself. 
4. Economic development since 1958 has been characterised by rapid economic 
growth, the so-called consumer society, and the emergence of a meso-economy(large 
multinational enterprises falling between the macro and micro-economic levels}. 
Pollution, waste and more generally the economic crisis and stagflation, from 
which we are slowly emerging, have to some extent resulted directly from these 
developments. 
So since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, numerous changes in com-
petition conditions have occurred which necessitate new developments in corn-. 
petition policy. 
b) New functions for competition policy 
S. Thus it seems that while maintaining its traditional functions, com-
petition policy should also become an instrument to combat inflation. To 
strengthen competition policy indeed seems to be a way to combat inflation. 
In today's less competitive economy this might principally be done through 
the application of Article 86. In the event of the abuse of a dominant 
position, price fixing may result from the deterioration of competition 
conditions. This practice is defined in Article 86 as "applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions". 
6. Competition policy can and ought also to act as an instrument to 
re-direct the economy. Competition must be stimulated to reduce the grow-
ing downward inelasticity of prices: for example, multinational companies 
often fix their prices at a relatively high level compared with the prices 
of marginal companies (an"umbrella price"). 
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c) The conclµsions to be drawn from the Fifth Report 
7. In view of the considerable changes in the economic system, it is clear 
that even though the Commission's Fifth Report mentions certain progress in 
and adaptation of the Community's competition policy, this policy nevertheless 
contains many gaps. 
(i) Progress 
8. As far as the application of Article 86 with regard to the problem of 
price-fixing is concerned, it may be noted that the Commission adopted an 
important decision in this field (United Brands company - Chiquita Bananas). 
Obviously, as the report itself states, the Commission should not "set itself 
up as a price-control authority" but it should nevertheless be clearly under-
stood that "the provisions of Article 86 which prohibit discriminatory and 
unfair prices must be enforceable". 1 
More generally still, and in order to use competition policy to combat 
inflation effectively, one may well ask if the Commission and the Community 
as a whole are willing to employ the necessary resolution and resources to 
suppress any price-fixing which arises from the abuse of a dominant position, 
whether this takes the form of discriminatory and unfair prices, or from an 
unfair transfer-pricing system. 
In this connection, it should be noted that the Commission has under-
~ taken a certain number of enquiries (some of which have been completed) into 
the prices of certain pharmaceutical products, for example, or the price of 
oil products during the period from October 1973 to March 1974. 
As regards transport policy, the Committee are pleased to note from the 
Fifth Report that the Commission has begun to prepare a proposal for a regu-
lation on the application of rules of competition in the field of sea and air 
2 transport. Sea and air transport are, in fact, the only economic sectors 
where no implementing provisions on rules of competition exist and this 
makes for uncertainty in the law, which is to the disadvantage of companies 
and users in this field. 
9. Finally, it should be noted that if any action on prices is to be com-
prehensive, measures should also be taken as regards public undertakings. 
1 The Fifth Report of the Commission of the European communities on 
Competition Policy, point 76. 
2 Fifth Report, points 14 and 15 
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The Conunittee welcome, therefore, the fact that the Fifth Report includes 
a new chapter devoted to this subject and that the Conunission intends to 
ensure that the financial links between governments and public undertakings 
are more transparent in the future. 1 
(ii) The Gaps 
10. In spite of the progress made, the Conununity's competition policy as 
outlined in the Fifth Report remains in many ways insufficient, particularly 
in this period of change. 
A less legalistic view of competition policy should go beyond scrutiny 
of the application of Articles 85-94 of the Treaty and include a more com-
prehensive approach which is unfortunately lacking in the Conununity com-
petition report. It seems that when the scope and functions of competition 
policy are considered, its effects are or could be wider than the Conunission 
thinks. 
The Scope of Competition Policy 
11. An examination of competition policy, which in all its aspects is 
linked to the situation both inside and outside the Conununity, shows that 
several fields are not covered in the Fifth Report. As far as the situation 
within the EEC is concerned, it seems advisable to draw attention to and call 
for consideration of the relationship and inter-action between competition 
policy and various other policies or fields. 
at a time when stock It could thus be useful to consider, especially 
is being taken of the Conunon Agricultural Policy 2 and there is the pros-
pect of possible change~.whatef£ectt~e application of the conunon Agricultural 
Policy machinery has had on competition. Whichever way the Conununity fish-
ing policy develops, there will be effects on competition policy, as there 
will also from any decisions reached by the Law of the Sea conference. The 
inter-action between the social policy and competition policy is also 
important, and the extent to which progress in social harmonisation is 
essential for the success of a genuine competition policy, should be considered. 
The approximation of laws (Article 100) is inseparable from competition 
policy. Once again, the Committee have to deplore the delay~ caused mainly 
by the Counci1 in gradually eliminating technical and administrative barriers 
to trade. 3 Distortion to competition may result, for example, from incom-
plete harmonisation of legislation on public contracts. 
1 
2 
3 
Fifth Report, point 159 
Ninth General Report on the activities of the European Conununities, 
point 248, et seq. 
The European Parliament has advocated the adoption of a new procedure 
in this area (see resolution in OJ No. c 5 of 8.1.1975). 
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Lastly, it is regrettable that the Fifth Report, like the Fourth 
Report, 1 makes no mention of the competition aspects of the Community's 
energy policy - common access to energy sources, common energy price level, 
competitivity of Community industries, etc.; as the Committee had stressed, 
the common market "cannot be maintained in the long term without a common 
2 
energy market!' 
12. As far as relations between the EEC and third countries are concerned, 
a complete examination of competition policy should be made as part of an 
overal study of the EEC's commercial policy. Consideration of competition 
policy cannot be dissociated from consideration of various very important 
problems upon which the Fifth Report does not expand at all. 
Firstly, the effect that the accession of new Member States could have 
on the application of rules of competition should be analysed in detail. 
In this respect, the Commission's opinion on the Greek application for 
• • • • 3 
membership is too imprecise. 
As regards relations between the EEC and state-trading countries, 
emphasis should bo put on the need for import liberalisation agreements 
to be accompanied by a genuine normalisation of trade relations so that, 
in the words of the final Helsink Act, there will be "an equitable dis-
tribution of comparable advantages and obligations" 4 between the EEC 
and state-trading countries. 
In general, and in view of the Connnission's recognised powers in this 
field, the Cornrnission should soon submit proposals to deal with the problem 
of proliferating export credits as its recent proposal to create a European 
Export Bank is not likely to remedy the serious distortions of competition 
that result from the lack of Community policy in this field. 
The Committee regret that the Fifth Report artificially separates 
competition policy from, or fails to link it adequately to, the broader 
fields mentioned above. Inadequate Community action partly explains the 
obstacles confronting competition policy in its new role as an instrument 
to combat inflation and to re-direct the economy. 
1 Norrnanton Report (Doc.164/75), point 48 
2 The report drawn up on behalf of the committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs on the effects of increased energy prices on Member States' pro-
ductivity by Mr Guldberg (Doc.431/75) p.20; this report has not yet been 
adopted by the European Parliament. 
3 Doc.COM(76) 30 final, p.12 
4 Ninth General Report, point 512 
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The Functions of Competition Policy 
13. If one sees competition policy as having a role in helping to resolve 
the current economic problems, it can be seen that it is necessary to take 
action in the field of consumer protection. In the new type of growth 
gradually emerging, the definition of a pattern of consumption tends to pre-
cede that of production. A consumer policy should contribute to the combating 
of abuses such as mis-represcntation and wilful deception. It is very much 
to be regretted that the Fifth Report makes no mention of this need. Rapid 
implementation of the Council resolution of 14 April 1975 on consumer pro-
tection and information policy is one of the things required. 
14. Similarly, if one sees competition policy as an instrument for~-
directing the economy, the important subject of control of industrial con-
centrations must be stressed. The Committee very much regret that the Council 
has not yet pronounced on the Commission's proposal for a regulation in this 
study carried out by the Commission on the develop-
should be followed up by a more specific commitment 
by the Commission on future action. 2 
field. The very careful 
t f t . 1 men o concen ration 
The profit-earning capacity of small and medium-sized firms should also 
be increased (through appropriately structured corporation taxation, easier 
access to credit, technical assistance, the European Company, European 
Cooperation Grouping, etc.) as this is generally their sole source of finance 
for investment. So far, the "active" aspect of competition policy has too 
often been neglected in favour of a "passive" concept of pure control. 
15. Finally, even with regard to traditional functions of competition policy, 
the method followed by the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 could be 
improved. For example, the Commission's criteria for implementing Articles 85 
and 86, which may be deduced from its case by case decisions, are not given 
enough publicity amongst firms which may be affected. Moreover, the 
Commission's report and its competition policy in general suffer through not 
being founded on a concrete knowledge of the development of competition 
policies within the individual Member states and through the lack of co-
ordination of national competition policies which would also involve the 
close coordination of national economic policies. 3 
1 
2 
Fifth Report, part 3, point 160 Eft seq. 
Fifth Report, point 203 
3 
Resolution of the European Parliament on competition rules and the position 
to European firms in the common market and in the world economy, point 17, 
OJ No. C 66/11 of 1.7.1971 
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3. The Position of the Conunittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
From the above, it is quite clear that the effects of competition policy 
from the point of view of either its scope or its functions are much greater 
than would appear from the Conunission's annual report. Such an observation 
is not completely new. The re-examination of competition policy which the 
Conunittee now call for is completely in accordance with the position they 
have adopted in the past. 
a) Previous position of the Conunittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
16. The reports drawn up on behalf of the Economic Conunittee by 
Mr Berkhouwer on the Rules of Competition and the Position of European 
Firms in the Conunon Market and in the World Economy, 1 which preceded and 
gave rise to the conunission's annual report on competition policy, contain 
a clear statement of the European Parliament's views. 
These reports have two fundamental and complementary premises: the 
economic and technical necessity of creating large production units which 
implies the need to encourage mergers and concentrations in the individual 
Member States through abolishing legal and fiscal obstacles, 2 and on the 
other hand,in order to avoid distortions of competition, a parallel need 
for an extended control involving application for prior notification of 
concentration, a control on the activities of multinational companies, the 
application also of the Treaty rules of competition to public undertakings, 
"insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance 
in law or in fact of the particular tasks assigned to them" (Article 90), 
measures to harmonise and coordinate State aids, and also, measures to pro-
mote small and medium-sized firms. 3 
Finally, the resolution expresses the desire for a harmonisation of 
Conununity and national competition policies. 4 
b) The present position of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
17. There is not one of the conclusions of these previous.reports and 
resolutions which might not be reiterated today in view of the fact that 
they aim at ensuring an increase and extension of the application of com-
petition rules. It is with the desire to achieve this in mind that the 
Committee now will examine in detail the main contents of the Fifth Report. 
1 Doc.197 of 2.2.1970 and Doc.227 of 3.2.1971: see also the above-mentioned 
resolution of 1.7.1971 (see footnote (3), p.10). 
2 
3 
4 
See points 4, 5 and 6 of the resolution of 1.7.1971 
See points 9, 12, 13, 14 ~nd 15 of the resolution of 1.7.1971 
See point 17 of the above-mentioned resolution of 1.7.1971 
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II THE RELATIONSHIP BEl'WEEN COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON 
COMPETITION 
18. The Committee are surprised to see that the Fifth Report contains no 
reference to this important subject. The Fourth Report did devote a section 
to this, on which the Committee commented in their report last year. 
The European Parliament, in its resolution of 18 October 19741 , called 
for legally-binding rules to be laid down governing the relationship between 
national and Community law. 
The Committee wonder whether the absence of any information in the Fifth 
Report indicates ti1at there has been no progress in this direction. They 
recall that the Commission intended to hold a meeting with Member States' 
experts to work out rules to improve exchange of information before the end 
of 1975 and would like to know if this meeting did take place and, if so, 
what progress was made. 
19. It would be desirable to establish some legally-binding basis for exchanges 
of information and consultations as was done in order to combat tax evasion and 
avoidance. 
Such compulsory consultation would not interfere with the sovereignty of 
national authorities/courts of justice; it would create better opportunities 
for adapting procedures, and so it would not in the first instance be necessary 
to introduce a rule compelling national authorities/courts of justice to wait 
for Community decisions before taking any decisions on questions in which there 
might be a conflict between the use of national rules and Community rules. 
t 
Harmonj1sation of national legislation on competition 
20. As the Committee have pointed out before, the EEC Treaty does not pre-
suppose actual harmonisation of legislation on competition in the Member States. 
It merely lays down a Community law for cases where trade between Member States 
is affected by agreements or misuse of a dominant position. In the Committee's 
opinion, if the Common Market is to function properly, Member States' legisla-
tion o~ competition will gradually have to be further harmonised in accordance 
with Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. 
1 o.J. No c 140, page 65 of 13.11.1974 
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21. In this connection, the Committee would remind the Commission that they 
have in the past asked for the Commission to make available to the European 
Parliament the reports made by the Member States to the OECD on the develop-
ment of national competition policies. Reports from some of the Member States 
for 1974 were received by the Committee secretariat, and even more limited 
information (for France and Germany only) has been received for 1975. There 
seems to be no reason why the Commission should not provide full information 
to the European Parliament on developments within the Member States, if neces-
sary by producing it itself. 
Such information is necessary to verify that developments in national 
legislation are at variance with Community policy; parallel development at 
national and Community level should be the immediate aim. The information 
could usefully appear in the annual report on competition policy. Indeed, 
the European Parliament asked in a resolution1 in 1971 that the Commission 
should report each year to the Parliament on the competition policy of the 
Community and of the Member States. The Commission has confined itself to 
reporting on Community developments. 
l O.J. No c 66/13 of 1.7.1971 
PE 44.992/fin. 
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III COMPETITION POLICY AND FIRMS 
Patent licensing agreements 
22. In 1975 the Commission took a certain number of new decisions on patent 
licensing agreements which, although they were useful in defining certain 
points, did not modify the principle of the Commission's position. With re-
gard to thjg, the Commission confirmed its pragmatic position according to 
which it does not regard "some clauses in patent licenses as per se infringe-
ments of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty ••• the facts of each case have to 
be examined before it can be decided whether Article 85(1) has been infringed~l 
Such an approach does not really satisfy the wish often expressed by the 
Committee2 to see the Commission formulate "an unambiguous policy in this area, 
without which it is difficult for undertakings to align their activities with 
the requirements of the Community 113 which implies in the long-term the defini-
tion of precise norms. 4 
23. 5 In the introduction to the Fifth Report, it is stated that "now that seven 
decisions have been issued, it is possible to contemplate the preparation of a 
regulation exempting certain categories of patent licensing agreement 116 , a 
statement which is extremely vague. This would be a step in the right direc-
tion, however, and the Committee hope that such a regulation, with the grounds 
for exemption clearly stated, will appear in the near future. 
24. The Committee have noted with satisfaction the signature in Luxembourg on 
15 December 1975 of a Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market. 
They have long desired the adoption of such a Convention which creates a Com-
munity law above Member States' legislation but deplore that it ha~.not been 
ratified. It is regrettable though to note the existence, although the 
Commission was not able to give its approval to it, of an Article (43(2)) 
which allows infringement proceedings to be brought against a licensee who 
supplies patented goods to customers outside his allotted territory but 
within the Common Market. This. limitation on the principle of non-separation 
of markets undermines the efforts which the Commission has made in this field. 
1 Fifth Report of the Commission, page 22 
2 See the Artzinger Report on the Third Report on Competition Policy (Doc. 290/74) 
and the Normanton Report on the Fourth Report (Doc. 164/75): the latter report 
was not adopted by the Eurq:>ean Parliament 
3 Normanton Report (Doc. 164/75), motion for a resolution point 14 
4 Normanton Report (Doc. 164/75), explanatory note point 21 
5 In some language versions, six 
6 Fifth Report of the Commission, page 8 
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25. The European Parliament believes that the problems faced by the 
commission in this field arise from the conflict between the Treaty of 
Rome and national systems of industrial property law. This conflict is 
apparent in Article 43 of the Convention for the European Patent for the 
common Market. There is evidence that the long delay in resolving these 
problems is inhibiting the flow of technology in the EEC; there is an 
increasing reluctance on the part of firms to enter into license agreements. 
26. The European Parliament therefore makes proposals for dealing with two 
of the most difficult and fundamental aspects of the problem. The commission 
should consider laying down guidelines on exclusive rights in license agree-
ments to say when such rights are regarded as permissible. On the subject 
of territorial restrictions on license agreements, the commission should 
arrange a further conference of government experts similar to that held 
in December 1974 in order to try and resolve this problem with the Member 
states. 
Trademarks 
27 •. The Committee note the Commission's efforts to apply the Court of Justice's 
1 
rulings concerning the free movement of trademarked goods. They would recall, 
however, that they drew attention last year2 , in connection with the ruling on 
Hag Coffee (Case 192/73) to the confusion which could be experienced by consu-
mers faced with two different products with the same trademark. 
Selective Marketing (Distribution) 
28. The Committee recall that their report last year urged "the Commission to 
3 
establish guidelines for judging selective distribution arrangements" and are 
therefore pleased that the Commission has "stated the limits within which it 
will tolerate selective distribution systems 114 • Nevertheless, in view of the 
generality these guidelines, the Committee would stress the need for continued 
development in this field, with°a view to amplifying these basic principles. 
1 Fourth Report of the Commission, point 60 
2 Normanton Report (Doc. 164/75), point 24 
3 Normanton Report (Doc. 164/75), motion for a resolution point 15 
4 Fifth Report of the Commission, page 8 
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Restrictive Trade Practices 
29. The Committee agree that "the Commission's gradually developing case law 
has clarified the significance of the rules laid down by the Treaties" l .. 
They feel, however, that it would be particularly useful here for the 
Commission to clearly indicate in its reports the benefits which might be 
expected to accrue to the consumer as a result of actions in this field. 
Oil Companies 
30. The Committee note that the Commission states the conclusions of its 
report on the behaviour of the oil companies in the Fifth Report, and await 
with interest the results of the Commission's further investigation into 
certain aspects of the oil business. They will not comment on the conclusi'ons 
of the Commission Report here, in view of the fact that they are preparing a 
separate report on this subject. 2 
Multinational Companies 
31. The Committee recall that in their two previous reports they welcomed the 
fact that the Commission was taking part in international cooperation and the 
control of restrictive practices within the framework of the OECD which, they 
felt, offered even greater scope than cooperation within the Community. 3 The 
Fifth Report confines itself to saying that guidelines are being worked out 
within the OECD to help multinationals comply with the basic objectives of 
h t t . 4 os coun ries. 
The Committee have discussed this topic separately, paying particular 
attention to the results of the meeting between delegations from the European 
Parliament and the United States Congress. The question of whether rules 
for the ccnduct of multinational companies should be voluntary or legally 
binding was considered, and, in view of the fact that some members of the 
Committee thought that it would be undesirable for Member States to sign the 
recently drawn up OECD code which would not have legal force, the Committee 
decided to make a separate report on th:issubject. 
They will therefore, at this stage, only reaffirm the importance of com-
petition policy in this area, and ask the Commission whether their view as 
stated in the Third Report, that 'no practical difficulties have arisen in the. 
past from the fact that a firm is multinational' (i.e. from the point of view 
of competition), remains unchanged. 
1 Fifth Report of the Commission, page 9 
2 PE 43.650/rev. 
Artzinger Report (Doc. 290/74) Explanatory statement, point a 
4 Normanton Report (Doc. 164/75) Explanatory statement, points 30 and 31 
Fifth Report of the Commission, point 17 
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Credit Institutions 
32. The Committee regret the absence of any reference to these in the Fifth 
Report, as this is clearly an area of great importance from the point of view 
of competition policy. It is vital that greater harmonisation of provisions 
on banking be achieved to enable full competition between banks in different 
Memper States. In this context the Committee would refer to their Report1on 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions governing the 
commencement and carrying on of the business of credit institutions where they 
called for the Commission to consider the extent to which Commission provisions 
should later ensure that different kinds of credit institutions in the various 
national markets should be subject to uniform conditions of competition, and to 2 . 
their report of last year. 
State Monopolies of a Commercial Character 
33. The Committee are dismayed to hear from the Commission that although 
the French and Italian sales monopolies for tobacco have now been formally 
abolished, the-two monopolistic organisations have been trying to maintain 
their position by making exclusive agreements with producers of tobacco 
products in other countries. The Committee hope that the Commission will 
be able to take speedy action to prevent any such abuse. They also await 
with interest the results of the Commission's investigation of Benelux's 
tobacco pricing system to ascertain whether there has been any breach of 
the Treaty. 
34. The Committee note that the Court of Justice has not yet given a ruling 
as to whether a national organisation of the market in alcohol is compatible 
with the Treaty, and that the Commission are awaiting this before taking any 
further action regarding adjustment of the French and German alcohol 
monopolies vis-a-vis the new Member States. 
35. The Committee also note that the existence of certain State production 
monopolies does not conflict with the Treaty, but call on the Commission to 
continue its efforts to ensure that there is no abuse of a dominant position 
by these monopolies. 
Sea and Air Transport 
36. The Commission states in the Fifth Report that it has begun work on 
proposals to the council for special regulations applying the rules of 
competition to sea and air transport in accordance with the Court of Justice's 
ruling confirming that the general provisions of the Treaty were ~cable 
in these sectors 3 '!,I,.·-
1 Scholten Report (Doc.66/75) 
2Normanton Report (Doc.164/75), motion for a resolution, para.12 
3Fifth Report page 9 
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It is clear that the Community rules of competition have not been 
strictly applied in these fields in the past, and it is regrettable that 
the commission does not give more information about the action it intends 
to take. 
In the Fifth Report the Commission says merely that any regulations 
"will take account of the need for uniform application of these (competition) 
rules and at the same time of the specific features of these modes of 
transport 111 • In the Commission report and proposal to the Council for 
an action programme for the European Aeronautical Sector (Doc.319/75), the 
commission speaks of "a system of regulated competition111 , but although the 
committee sought clarification on this point during their discussions 
2 preparing their report, none has been forthcoming. 
Public Procurement 
37 • This is an issue which is clearly of great importance for competition 
policy. If governments give unjustified preference to thEir national firms, 
as regrettably they often do (defence procurement is an outstanding example), 
competition between firms in different Member States is distorted. The 
commission has in the past given some consideration to this problem, but 
development seems to be slow. In any case, such progress as there may 
have been should be described in the Commission's reports on competition 
policy. 
Price studies and Consumer Policy 
38. The committee are extremely disappointed to discover that, in spite of 
the fact that they welcomed "the Commission's attempt to try to uncover 
infringements of the EEC's competition rules through comparisons of prices 
for identical goods in the different Member States" and urged the Commission 
"to elaborate the analyses and to expand the range of goods for which price 
comparisons are made 113 , the Commission has apparently not continued with 
the type of study it initiated last year. 
The regret occasioned by this lapse is reinforced by the surprising 
absence of any reference to consumer policy in the Fifth Report. The 
commission acknowledges the role that competition policy can play in 
helping to control inflation, and while its statement that "measures to 
halt the abuse of dominant position cannot be converted into systarnatic 
monitoring of prices114 may be accepted, it is very' important to identify 
the causes of price differences for identical products between Member States, 
which can, after all, be one of several indications that Community rules 
on competition are being broken. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Doc.319/75, Article 3(a) 
Guldberg Report (PE 43.158/rev.) point 43 
Normanton Report (Doc.164/75) Resolution point 13 
Fifth Report, page 13. 
- 21 - PE 44.992/ fin. 
In this connection, it should be remembered that the excessive 
complexity of customs formalities and the existence of administrative or 
technical obstacles to trade constitute a not inconsiderable factor in 
increasing the cost of products and price variations. Continued action 
in this field is important, as the European Parliament has pointed out 
several times1 • 
Small- and medium-sized companies 
39. The Committee note the Commission's statement that the regulation it 
is preparing exempting certain categories of patent licensing agreement 
should benefit small- and medium-sized firms in particular2 • In view of 
the desirability, for both economic and social reasons, of strengthening 
these firms, given the trend towards ever larger and more impersonal 
economic organisations, the Committee would be interested to hear the 
Commission's views on how competition policy might play a role. In any 
case the Committee will be preparing a separate report on this subject. 
Insurance 
40. In view of the extent to which the Commission is proposing regulations 
which apply to insurance activities in the Community, it is somewhat sur-
prising that it has not taken into account the competition aspects of these 
policies. 
1 
2 
Mitterdorfer Report (Doc.22/75) on the customs union, including 
the programme for the simplification of customs procedures. 
Fifth Report, Introduction p.8 
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IV COMPETITION POLICY AND STATE AID 
General 
41. As the Committee feared, last year the Commission had "to deal with 
significantly more cases of assistance granted by Member States to offset 
the industrial and social effects of the serious economic crisis which the 
Community is experiencing"! The Committee fully appreciate the necessity 
of Member States trying to offset these industrial and social effects, but 
question whether this is always done in the most desirable way with regard 
to the development of the Community as a whole. 
It bears repeating, in spite of the frequency with which it has been 
stated in the past, that.°if the Community is to overcome its present 
serious economic difficulties, there will have to be a considerable 
structural adaptation in its economic system. State aids should be 
designed for the purpose of achieving this restructuring. Insofar as they 
do this, they may be regarded as desirable, but insofar as they merely 
serve to prop up an obsolete industrial structure,or inhibit logical and 
natural forces for changes, they are to be deplored. It is clearly foolish, 
moreover, for the Member States of the Community to seek to bolster their 
own industry at the expense of that of other Member States, with the result 
that higher and higher aids by Member States cancel out the effect of each 
other. 
42. If competing and competition-distorting national aids are to be avoided, 
the Commission must play a large role. There are two facets of this role: 
industrial policy and competition policy. An industrial policy is vital 
if the Community is to achieve a rational economic(and social) development. 
It must decide in the light of the changed world situation, which industrial 
sectors should be developed, and which allowed to decline. The Committee 
assume that the Commission is fully aware of the need for such a policy, and 
that it will pay due attention to this in its forthcoming Medium-Term Economic 
Programme, but there is little or no evidence in the Commission's reports 
generally in support of it. 
43. The rules of competition must then be enforced to ensure that rational 
economic development is notj:opardised by the introduction or continuation 
of incompatible national aids. Commission action should aim at preventing 
the introduction of new aids which would distort competition or merely lead 
to a round of aid increases by all the Member States. The Fifth Report 
indicates that it has had some success in this field, but competing and 
l Fifth Report, Introduction page 7 
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competition-distorting aids indubitably continue to exist, and the Commission 
must be careful not to give the impression that it will adapt its competition 
rules to justify almost any form of aid which a Member State desires to 
introduce. 
Regional Aid 
44. The committee are pleased to note that, following their request in 
the Normanton Report last year asking the Commission "to aim at a coordinated 
Community aid system covering the various rules concerning the granting of 
national aid111 , the Commission "has worked out new principles for coordinating 
regional aid throughout the Commission which take account of the economic 
and social requirements of each region" 2 It is vital that a high degree 
of transparency for regional aid must be achieved if regional development 
plans are to be properly evaluated within the context of overall economic 
development. Moreover, the application of ceilings of intensity of aids 
is important if those regions most in need of help are to be given the 
desired priority. The Commission's principles, if assiduously applied, 
should enable a Community regional policy to achieve some measure of 
success. 
One important point which deserves consideration is the tendency 
reported for some Member States to cut regional aid from national sources 
when their aid from Community sources is increased. Such conduct, besides 
affecting competition in the widest sense, to a large extent frustrates 
the aims of a community regional policy (a policy which is already completely 
inadequate), and is to be deplored. If the Community is to mean anything to 
its citizens, then Community aid of all kinds must be identified and seen as 
such. The link with "Brussels" must be visible and not concealed within the 
handouts of Member States. The Community (including the European Parliament) 
aid to refugee and disaster funds (e.g. the Sahe! and Friuli) is a particular 
case in point. 
Sectoral Aid 
4S. The Fifth Report outlines action which has been taken by Member States 
to support specific sectors of industry. The Committee note that while the 
Commission in one or two cases prevailed upon a Member State to modify a 
proposed scheme of aid to conform to Community principles, in most instances 
it raised no objection to the aid measures proposed on the grounds that they 
did conform to the principles and conditions the Commission sought to 
enforce. 
1 
2 
Normanton Report (Doc.164/75) resolution point 8 
Fifth Report, Introduction p.8 
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Here it is opportune to reiterate two points made above. First, it 
must be stressed that the principal aim behind any sectoral aid must be the 
restructuring of that sector to conform to changed world conditions, though, 
as the Commission states, aid which in itself neither aimed at nor resulted 
in structural improvement would be allowed in the case of two categories of 
undertaking - "those which are basically sound a11d whose problems will 
disappear as soon as the economy picks up and those where rationalisation 
is called for but which need a respite while the necessary programmes are 
studied, formulated and initiated. 111 
second, though there is some scepticism on this, the reason for the 
commission's approval in nearly all cases of sectoral aid may well be that 
the Member states took the Commission's views into account before making pro-
posals for new aids, but if this is the case the Commission should make it 
clear, as it is important not to give the impression that Community rules 
can be adapted to fit almost any case. 
46. In one specific instance the Committee would welcome further 
information from the Commission. The Third Directive on aids to ship-
building, which was adopted by the Council on July 10, 1975, provided for a 
gradual reduction in national aids to this sector. The Committee would 
like to know if the planned reductions, and certain other specific 
conditions, are being fulfilled. 
Energy Policy 
4 7. In a year in which the community's economy has been so acutely affected 
by the energy crisis, it seems strange that the Fifth Report makes no men-
tion of the competition aspects of a Community energy policy. In view of 
the necessity to make progress at Community level in this vital area, and 
bearing in mind the fact that action to develop Community supplies of energy 
may not be strictly in accordance with the principles of free competition, 
this is a serious omission2 by the Commission. 
Public Undertakings 
48. The Committee are content to observe that the Commission is finally 
intending to examine whether "the business conduct of public undertakings, 
which may be supported by public funds for fairly long periods, could lead 
to distortions of competition113 . The directive which the Commission states 
1 
2 
3 
Fifth Report, point 133 
See also the Guldberg Report (Doc.431/7~ on energy prices and the 
competitivity of European industry. 
Fifth Report, point 159. 
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it is preparing "based on Article 90(3) of the EEC Treaty with the three-
fold aim of clarifying for Member States their responsibilitim under 
Article 90 introducing rules which will put the.commission in a better 
position to check on compliance with the Treaty by Member States operating 
through public undertakings and by the undertakings themselves, and 
finally making the financial links between governments and public under-
takings more transparent", should be introduced without delay. 
49. The Committee wonder whether the Commission might not have a wider role 
to play in this area with particular reference to the need to preserve fair 
competition between the public and private sectors. The Commission should 
consider drawing up criteria for what is fair and what is unfair competition. 
These criteria would apply equally to both sectors, public and private. The 
Commission might also be prepared to act as arbitrator in particular cases 
involving disputes between firms in the two sectors. 
Export Credits 
~O. The committee arc concerned to discover that export credits, which 
are having a growing influence on the implementation of Community competition 
policy, are not mentioned in the Fifth Report. In view of recent 
developments in this field - the gentleman's agreement between the USA, 
Japan and four EEC Member States (France, Germany, Italy andBritain), the 
extension of the cost increase guarantee system and the Commission's.plan 
to establish a European Export Bank1 (a step which many of the Committee 
feel is completely irrelevant to the main problem of harmonising export 
credits) - the problem should certainly have been included in the Fifth 
Report, as there are distorting effects within the Community as well as 
outside. 
1 Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs opinions to the Committee 
on External Economic Relations (PE 43.238/fin.) on export aid and 
PE 44.463 on a European Export Bank. 
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V CONCENTRATIONS 
51. The Committee are disappointed to see that the 32 pages devoted by 
the Fifth Report to this subject are purely descriptive; no conclusions 
are drawn by the Commission from the data it has amassed. It states, for 
example, that "in 1973 and 1974 the number of national and international 
operations in the Community continued to rise, the highest increase being 
1 in takeovers and mergers" but does not use this piece of information to 
decide what action, if any, should be takin in this field. It might 
conclude for instance that this increased the need for strict control to 
prevent the abuse of dominant positions. 
52. The Committee, however, will stress yet again2 the necessity for the 
Council to adopt the proposal for a regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings in the form approved by the European 
Parliament. The Commission is well aware of the importance of action in 
this respect at least for it states that it "has asked the ~ouncil to 
intensify its work on the proposed merger control regulation. 113 
1 
2 
3 
Fifth Report, point 202 
Artzinger Report 1974, resolution point 11 and Normanton Report, 
resolution point 19 
Fifth Report, Introduction, page 9 
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